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BIASED SELECTION WITHIN THE SOCIAL HEALTH






Reducing the impact of insurance market failures with regulations such as community-rated premiums,
standardized benefit packages and open enrolment, yield limited impact because they create room for selection
bias.  The Colombian social health insurance system started a market approach in 1993 on the expectation to
improve performance of preexisting monopolistic insurance funds by exposing them to competition by new
entrants.  It is hypothesized that market failures would lead to biased selection favoring new entrants.  Two
household surveys are analyzed using Self-reported health status and the presence of  chronic conditions as
indicators of prospective risk of enrolees.  Biased selection is found to take place, leading to adverse selection
among incumbents, and favorable selection among new entrants.  This pattern is observed in 1997 and
worsens in 2003.  Although the two incumbents analyzed are public organizations, and their size dropped
substantially between these two years, fiscal implications in terms of  government bailouts are analyzed.
Key words: Social Health Insurance, Biased selection, Market-based reforms, Colombia
JEL Classification: I11, I18, H51, D41
RESUMEN
Las regulaciones como primaje comunitario, paquetes estandarizados y afiliación abierta, orientadas a
reducir el impacto de las fallas en los mercados de seguros, tienen un efecto limitado puesto que abren espacio
a la selección sesgada. A partir de 1993, el sistema de seguridad social en salud en Colombia fue reformado
hacia un enfoque de mercado con la expectativa de mejorar el desempeño de los monopolios preexistentes
exponiéndolos a la competencia de nuevos entrantes. La hipótesis que se maneja en el trabajo es que las fallas
de mercado pueden llevar a selección sesgada favoreciendo a los nuevos entrantes. Se analizaron dos encuestas
de hogares utilizando el estado de salud auto reportado y la presencia de enfermedad crónica como indicadores
prospectivos del riesgo de los afiliados. Se encuentra que hay selección sesgada, llevando a selección adversa
entre los aseguradores preexistentes, y a selección favorable entre los nuevos entrantes. Este patrón se observa
en 1997 y se incrementa en el 2003. Aunque las entidades preexistentes son entidades públicas, y su tamaño
disminuyó sustancialmente entre estos años, se analizan sus implicaciones fiscales en términos de financiación
adicional por parte del gobierno.
Palabras claves:  Seguridad Social en Salud, Selección Sesgada, Reformas basadas en Mercados, Colombia
Clasificación JEL: I11, I18, H51, D41
* Versión preliminar. Citar con autorización de los autores.4 BIASED SELECTION WITHIN THE SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 63
1. INTRODUCTION
Competitive approaches to social health insurance face the limitations of the well-known
market failures of health insurance.  Whereas freedom of choice leads to better quality and lower
prices in many markets, health insurance markets exhibit wide information asymmetries which
are at the root of market failures in this industry.  An unregulated market approach allows insurance
carriers to adjust benefits and premiums to individuals’ risk (the so-called experience rating),
which is a source of market failure because precisely those in the highest need of insurance, i.e.,
the high-risk individuals, are excluded by the insurers due to the very high experience-rated premiums
they would face (Cutler, 2002).  The poor are also excluded because their willingness to pay for a
comprehensive package of benefits is very limited (Hsiao, 2002).
Market failures are typically addressed by regulations, taxes and subsidies.  However, setting
regulations to avoid the exclusion of the poor and the high-risk individuals from health insuran-
ce, falls short of expectations.  One common regulation is to prohibit experience rating and to
impose a premium that is estimated on the basis of a large group of individuals (the so-called
community rating).  This is expected to allow high-risk individuals to purchase insurance at an
affordable rate.  Another common regulation is to create a standard benefit package to prevent
insurers’ engaging into market segmentation.  Additional constraints include the prohibition to
reject applicants (so-called open enrolment), the prohibition of excluding preexisting condi-
tions, and standardized limits to waiting times for full insurance coverage.
However, regulations and subsidies give rise to new challenges derived from the failures of
insurance markets (Pauly, 1984).  On the one hand, community rating and standard benefit pack-
ages create incentives for competing insurance carriers to select the good risks and reject the bad
risks.  Although open enrolment is supposed to reduce this negative effect, insurance carriers still
have a number of strategies at hand to avoid high-risks, e.g., targeted marketing, network design,
and “incentives” to prompt high-risks to switch to competing insurance carriers.
Thus, biased selection seems to be a pervading problem of insurance markets, which has to
be weighted against competitive-based incentives for efficiency.  Too much risk exposure on
the side of insurers (which promotes efficiency), is counterbalanced by insurers’ selective be-
havior (which reduces efficiency).  Hence a selection-efficiency tradeoff that has proven diffi-
cult to solve (Barneveld, 2000)
On the side of the enrolee, open enrolment creates the threat of adverse selection, i.e., high-
risk individuals are more likely to enrol than low-risk individuals.  This can be dealt with, at
least in theory, by compulsory enrolment of all workers.  But adverse selection can also take
place among competing insurance carriers: some carriers would appear more attractive to high-
risk individuals than others, causing the former to end up with a larger share of high-risks, and
higher chances of financial failure.
Some social health insurance schemes in developing countries have turned to market ap-
proaches on the expectation of improving efficiency and quality (Londoño and Frenk, 1997).
But the regulatory frameworks to deal with the market failures created by such approaches face
the above mentioned drawbacks.  For example, the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS)RAMÓN CASTAÑO Y ANDRÉS ZAMBRANO 5
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has been reformed to allow individuals to opt-out to private insurance carriers, taking their
contributions to private funds in exchange of a benefit package at least as comprehensive as
that of IMSS.  This is expected to cause migration of the better-off and the low-risks to the
private funds, leaving the IMSS with an adverse selection and an increased risk of financial
failure (Gomez-Dantés, 2001).
The Chilean health system allows households in the upper income quintiles to purchase
health insurance from private carriers called ISAPREs, which compete among themselves for
enrolees.  Benefits are tailored to the applicant’s risk and contribution (a statutory 7% of salary),
but if contribution is not enough to cover the risk-adjusted benefits, the applicant has the
alternative to enrol in FONASA, a public fund that covers the remaining 70% of the popula-
tion. FONASA is a monopoly within this segment.  It has been argued that this design creates
incentives for ISAPREs to cream skim the market and leaves FONASA with the high-risk
individuals (Baeza and Copetta, 1999).
Industrialized countries have also experienced with some of these market approaches, ei-
ther with specific populations or on a countrywide basis.  In the United States, state-level
reforms to the individual insurance market have created regulatory frameworks that include
some or all of the regulations mentioned above.  These schemes have shown that although
average premiums increased, those for the low-risks increased, whereas those to the high-risk
decreased. This combination of changes has made low-risks less likely to enrol in these in-
surance schemes as compared to high-risks (Fuchs, 2004).  However, these experiences have
not been analyzed in terms of how biased selection takes place among competing insurers.  An
interesting experience is that of Medicare, whereby enrolees are prompted to switch to private
HMOs.  The evidence has shown that low-risks are more likely to switch to HMOs, and that
their average risk is lower than the expected per-capita premium set by Medicare (Mello et al,
2003).  This experience is similar to that of ISAPREs and IMSS, in the sense that private
carriers are competing to attract individuals from a public monopolistic fund that existed previ-
ous to enacting the reforms.
Countrywide experiences of competitive insurance approaches are well illustrated with the
case of the Netherlands.  A core insurance scheme –the WTZ standard insurance-   that covers
most events except catastrophic coverage and complementary services (like better amenities),
is financed through payroll taxes which are pooled in an equalization fund.  The equalization
fund pays a risk-adjusted community-rated premium to insurers for each enrolee, and insurers
have to compete for enrolees.  This creates incentives for insurance carriers to cream skim, i.e.,
avoiding high-risks and attracting low-risks.  In order to avoid such consequence, alternatives
of risk sharing have been considered, such as a prospective pool for high risks, or a retrospec-
tive sharing of high costs (Barneveld, 2000).
2. THE COLOMBIAN HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM
Colombia reformed its health system in 1993 in a number of key areas.  Regarding the
employment-based social health insurance scheme, which covers about one third of the population,
the most relevant reform was to open monopolistic insurance funds to a sort of managed competition.6 BIASED SELECTION WITHIN THE SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN COLOMBIA
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Before 1993, workers in the formal sector paid mandatory contributions to closed pools, to which
they were compulsorily enrolled.  The largest monopolistic fund, the ISS, covered private-sector
workers, whereas public-sector workers were enrolled in funds exclusive for state-owned enterprises
or for public universities or government units.  The two largest funds within this segment of
public-sector workers were Cajanal (which enrolled workers in the national-level government),
and Caprecom (which enrolled workers in the state-owned telecommunications, television and
postal enterprises).  Besides these two large funds, there were more than 1,000 small funds.
None of the existing employment-based funds (the ISS, Cajanal, Caprecom, and the other
1,000-plus funds) allowed enrolees to opt-out to other fund.  In addition, there was no pooling
of contributions among these funds.  No private funds participated in this compulsory social
health insurance system.
The 1993 reform created the Contributory Scheme for workers in the formal sector, either
public or private.  Under this scheme, these monopolistic funds (hereafter the incumbents)
were exposed to competition, by allowing new entrants to enter the market and by allowing
workers to select the insurer of their preference. The expectation was that incumbents would
have to improve quality and efficiency in order to survive, or otherwise leave the market.
According to government statistics, the Contributory scheme covered 14.9 million enrolees
in 1997, which was 37.2% of total country population (Ministry of Health of Colombia, 1998).
In 2003, the scheme covered 13.8 million lives, which was 31% of the total population (Ministry
of Social Protection of Colombia, 2004).
In order to avoid market failures and inefficient competitive behavior by new entrants (most
of them private, some of them for profit), key regulations were included in the law: risk-adjusted
community-rated capitation payments to insurers, standardized benefit package (covered
interventions, exclusions, waiting times for full coverage and co-insurance) open enrolment
(guaranteed issuing), full portability and compulsory enrolment.
However, as shown above, these regulations do not fully correct the market failures of
insurance markets.  In fact, notwithstanding the per-capita premium is risk adjusted, it only
includes age, gender and geographic area as adjusters.  These adjusters explains less than 1% of
variance in medical expenses at the individual level, thus leaving wide room for insurers to
select, particularly against high-cost enrolees (Newhouse, 1994).  In addition, risk-adjustment
does not prevent insurers from targeting their marketing efforts towards low-risk individuals or
large groups like those of large firms.
On the side of enrolees, they can cause biased selection by themselves, as the high-risks
(specifically, the elderly and the chronically ill) are more likely to have close ties with providers
and doctors, and therefore less likely to switch to new funds whose provider networks do not
include their doctor or health care facility (Mello, 2003).  Some authors have called this biased
persistence of sicker enrolees “adverse retention” (Swartz and Garnick, 1999) which reflects
the fact that migration to new plans is mostly exerted by healthier individuals.
Adverse selection has been previously analyzed in the social health insurance system in
Colombia.  Panopoulou, (2002) reports that when workers or their dependants have chronicRAMÓN CASTAÑO Y ANDRÉS ZAMBRANO 7
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conditions or report poor or fair health status, they are more likely to be enrolled in the Contributory
Scheme.  Vasquez and Gomez (2004) show that public insurers have a larger-than-proportional
share of elderly as compared to their private counterparts.  However, none of these reports analyze
biased selection among incumbents and new entrants in the Contributory Scheme.
The policy debate on adverse selection in Colombia, has focused mainly on high-cost
conditions, and specifically on HIV/AIDS and end-stage renal disease.  In fact, a series of
regulations have been passed between 2001 and 2004 to compensate the incumbents for their
adverse selection problem regarding these two clinical entities, with limited degree of success.
However, beyond high-cost conditions, the largest share of medical expenses is caused by
individuals that are not costly enough to be labelled as high-cost but can still be disproportionately
concentrated among some insurers, causing their financial failure.
In these lines, this paper analyzes biased selection in the Contributory Scheme, in order to
detect if new entrants are more likely to attract low-risk individuals, causing adverse selection
towards incumbents.  The next section describes the methods, then the results are shown.  A
brief discussion of findings and their policy implications is presented, and some policy recom-
mendations are suggested.
3. METHODS
The central hypothesis of this analysis is that incumbents, i.e., public insurers existing prior
to the health reform of 1993, are more likely to suffer adverse selection, and new entrants are
more likely to enjoy favorable selection, both as a consequence of market failures in the health
insurance market.
For this purpose, two national-level LSMS household surveys carried out in Colombia in
1997 and 2003 respectively, were analyzed.  These surveys include a set of questions related to
self-reported health status (SRHS), presence of chronic conditions (CC), and socio-demographic
characteristics of respondents.  The unit of analysis is the individual, and it included all the
observations, regardless of age, and whether they were workers or dependants.  The availability
of two cross-sections carried out four and ten years after the health care reform, gives a unique
opportunity to test the hypothesis of biased selection between incumbents and new entrants to
the social health insurance market in Colombia.
The dependent variable for this analysis is the type of insurer to which the individual is
enrolled.  Insurers were classified as incumbents and new entrants.  If the individual is enrolled
in the ISS and Cajanal the corresponding type of insurer is “incumbent”; otherwise, it is “new
entrant”.  A more detailed separation of insurers into these two categories is possible only in
the 1997 survey, whereas the 2003 survey only allows for the separation of ISS and Cajanal as
incumbents, because the codification of the rest of insurers is kept confidential.  It is important
to emphasize that these two insurers had the largest share of enrolment among incumbents.  In
1997, their share was 94% (Ministry of Health, 1998) and in 2003 it was 97% (Ministry of
Social Protection, 2004), so the bias towards zero difference, caused by lack of separation
of other incumbents is not large enough to invalidate the analysis.8 BIASED SELECTION WITHIN THE SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN COLOMBIA
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SRHS and the presence of chronic conditions (CC) were chosen as indicators of high- or
low-risk.  It has been shown that SRHS is a good predictor of mortality (Burstrom and Fredlund,
2001) and future use of health care resources (Thomas and Lichtenstein, 1986).  Even among
individuals with chronic conditions, this variable is a good predictor of use (Walen et al (2001),
Long and Marshall (1999)).  It has been argued that SRHS, as a simple four- or five-category
variable, has limited predictive power (Mello et al, 2003), and that stronger predictive power
can only be achieved by using more complex self-reported measures of health status (Manning
et al, 1988).  However, the fact that such complex measures are not available from routine
household surveys, makes SRHS a second-best alternative.
It can be thus assumed that high-risk individuals are inherently more likely to use health care
services than low-risk individuals, and thus to cause larger expenses to insurers (hence their
avoidance by insurers engaged in cream skimming, or insurer’s attempts to experience-rate premiums
in an unregulated market).  Consequently, it can be argued that individuals who report their health
status as fair or poor are high-risk in actuarial terms, whereas those reporting excellent or good
health status are low-risk individuals.  Accordingly, SRHS was treated as a dichotomous variable,
whereby those reporting excellent or good status (SRHS good) were classified as low-risks and
those reporting fair or poor health status (SRHS bad) were classified as high-risks.
Regarding CC, although this variable is also a strong predictor of use, the analyzed surveys
include a single question with a vague wording, and do not include a specific list of conditions.
They only mention diabetes and high-blood pressure, which makes it less likely that individuals
with other conditions actually report them.
SRHS and CC were compared according to type of insurer (incumbents vs. new entrants),
for each survey.  Proportions were then compared between both surveys to check for changes,
by the estimation of a pooled standard error1 to test the null hypothesis of no difference between
1997 and 2003.  It is hypothesized that new entrants enjoy favorable selection and incumbents
suffer adverse selection in 1997, and that both phenomena are kept in 2003.
Multivariate logistic regression analyses were run to control for the effect of covariates.  It is
hypothesized that age has a strong correlation with both SRHS and CC; this variable was
introduced separately as a continuous and as a categorical variable reflecting the seven age-
gender risk-adjustment groups of the per-capita premium.  Regarding income, it is hypothesized
that the better-off are more likely to switch to new entrants because at the time of opening the
insurance market, they were low users of the compulsory social health insurance funds to which
they were enrolled.  At the same time, these enrolees are more likely to have complementary
private insurance and their ties to doctors and providers are more likely to be kept within the
1 The pooled standard error (PSE) is estimated as follows:
 PSE =  22
12 (.. ) (.. ) tt seP seP +
where:
s.e.Pt1 is the standard error of the Proportion in 1997
s.e.P t2 is the standard error of the Proportion in 2003
The null hypothesis of no difference between Pt1 and Pt2 is rejected if | Pt1 - Pt2 | > z PSE, where z is the corresponding
value to an a of 0.05 or 0.01 in a normal distribution.RAMÓN CASTAÑO Y ANDRÉS ZAMBRANO 9
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provider networks of new entrants.  A control variable for income was included in the logistic
regression models, which was built based on information on household consumption.  It is
expressed in Colombian pesos and divided by 100,000.
In order to control for regional differences within the country, a set of dummy variables for
nine regions and another variable for rural/urban location of household were included.  Another
control variable was included for the size of the firm where the head of household works.  This
is based on the assumption that new entrants focus their marketing efforts on large groups
instead of small groups or self-employed workers, in order to reduce the threat of adverse
selection.
Statistical analysis was run using STATA version 8.0; sample design was taken into account
for the estimation of standard errors.
4. RESULTS
In 1997, out of the 14.9 million enrolees in the Contributory Scheme, incumbents’ (i.e., ISS and
Cajanal) share of enrolment was 66.9%.  In 2003, Incumbent’s share of the 13.8 enrolees was
29.3%.  Thus, incumbents reduced their share from two thirds to one third between 1997 and 2003.
Bi-variate analyses of proportions for each cross section show that incumbents are more likely
to have high-risk enrolees, in terms of SRHS for both surveys (p< 0.01).  Regarding CC, differences
in proportions between incumbents and new entrants are nonsignificant in 1997, but they turn
significant in 2003 (p<0.01).  When proportions are compared between 1997 and 2003 within
each type of insurer, incumbents show a statistically significant increase (p< 0.01) in high-risks, in
terms of individuals reporting both SHRS-bad and CC.  New entrants, on the other hand, show
non-significant differences in proportions. Table 1 shows the bivariate analysis of proportions and
the comparisons between the two surveys.  It is evident from this table that the risk structure of
new entrants is preserved, whereas incumbents’ risk structure is worsened because the proportion
of high-risks increases.  Risk structure can be better illustrated by estimating the ratio of high-
risks to low-risks for each type of insurer.  Table 2 shows that this ratio increases between 1997
and 2003 for incumbents, but it remains fairly stable for new entrants.
Multivariate logistic regression analyses show that the effect of SRHS on type of insurer
(incumbent vs new entrant) remains statistically significant in 1997 after controlling for income
and regional variables.  That is to say, individuals reporting fair or poor health status (SHRS
bad) are more likely to be enrolled in the ISS or Cajanal.  Introducing age as a continuous
variable caused no changes and showed non-significant effects on the dependent variable.  When
age-gender categories were introduced, the coefficient of SRHS dropped to non-significant
levels.  It was expected from the high correlation between these two variables, as can be seen in
table 3. Introducing a set of dummies to control for number of workers at the firm where the
head of household is employed, resulted in non-significant effects and no alteration of
the coefficients of SRHS.
The control variables showed the same effects in the logistic regression models for 2003 on
the SRHS dependent variable.10 BIASED SELECTION WITHIN THE SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN COLOMBIA
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Regarding CC, logistic regressions show a positive but non-statistically significant effect on
type of insurer in 1997, whereas it becomes statistically significant in 2003 after controlling for
income and regional variables.  That is to say, individuals reporting chronic conditions were
more likely to be enrolled in the ISS or Cajanal in 2003.  It was also found that introducing age-
gender categories reduced the effect of CC in 2003 to non-significant levels.
Tables 4 shows the logistic regression results for 1997 and 2003 respectively.
5. DISCUSSION
Health care systems in many developing countries are characterized by having a large social
insurance fund or a set of funds that cover workers in the formal sector with a large degree of
vertical segmentation (Londoño and Frenk, 1997).  Their monopoly power over captive popu-
lations has raised concerns for quality and efficiency, so exposing them to competition seems an
adequate strategy to force these funds to improve their performance.
However, the market failures of insurance reduce the effectiveness of this strategy.  Selective
behavior on both the insurer and the individual side, cause inefficiencies that reduce the expected
benefits of competition as compared to other sectors where competitive approaches lead to
lower prices and better quality.
This study shows that there has been such biased selection in the competitive approach of
the Contributory Scheme: between 1997 and 2003, incumbents increased their ratio of hig-risk
to low-risk enrolees, whereas new entrants showed a more favorable ratio in 1997 that was
preserved in 2003.
As a step ahead in the debate on adverse selection in Colombia, this study adds the fact that
the problem involves not only those high-cost patients in the far-right tail of the cost distribu-
tion, but also a group of not-so-costly patients that represent a much larger share of expenses.
This implies that even if the unequal distribution of high-cost patients were equalized, a large
part of the biased selection problem would still persist.
As mentioned before, biased selection arises as a consequence of selective behavior on both
the insurer and the individual sides.  Unfortunately, this study cannot separate these two ef-
fects.  On the side of insurers, cream skimming is a plausible explanation, because no matter
the per-capita premium they receive is risk adjusted, the wide space of unexplained variance
leaves room for insurers to select.  For example, a report in 1997 suggested that the group of
women aged 15 to 44, whose premium is rated above average (because of the risks associated
to reproductive health), gave insurers an incentive to attract those women between 40 and 44
years old, who are less likely to have reproductive health events, and therefore show lower
expected loss ratios (Harvard, 1996).  In addition, it is well known that the distribution of
individual health expenditures is highly skewed. A study of this phenomenon in two private
insurers in the Contributory Scheme in Colombia, it was shown that 10% of enrolees generated
72% of medical expenditures in 1998 (Castano, 2001).  Thus, once an insurer detects a high
spender, the gains from inducing a switch to other insurer are enormous (Newhouse, 1994).
This switch can be induced by putting barriers to access to necessary care or by suggesting theRAMÓN CASTAÑO Y ANDRÉS ZAMBRANO 11
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individual to “exert choice” by selecting another insurer that better meets his/her needs.  In
fact, Luft and Miller (1988) argue that the effect of health status measures is stronger to explain
HMOs disenrolment: high-risk individuals are more likely to be disenrolled.
Cream skimming can also take place through targeted marketing.  In this sense, new entrants
may have focused their marketing efforts on large firms on the expectation of attracting a mix
of workers and dependants that reflects average risk. Nevertheless, the findings of this study
suggest that this was not an effective mechanism for cream skimming.
But carefully crafted mass media campaigns can also attract healthy or rich individuals though
not necessarily deter the ill and the poor.  However, the ISS, who was the largest player at the
beginning of the Contributory Scheme in 1993, decided to advertise itself in the opposite
direction, as the leader in high-cost technology (e.g., the first insurer to cover heart-lung trans-
plantation in 1997) and the only insurer that did not charge co-payments and did not apply
waiting periods.  It is very likely that these three strategies discouraged high-risk and poor
enrolees to switch to the new entrants, and encouraged high-risk and poor individuals to switch
from other insurers which certainly contributed to its adverse selection problem.
On the side of enrolees, adverse selection can be strongly explained by the fact that new
entrants are not attractive to the elderly and the chronically ill, or in general to those whose
health status is less than good, because these individuals are more likely to have close ties with
their doctors and providers.  This effect could have been explained by age alone, but the multi-
variate regression models showed a strong collinearity with health status measures, so the rel-
evant variable is health status and not age.  Keeping SRHS or CC instead of age takes into
account the fact that even within age groups, individuals with poor health are more likely to
remain enrolled in the ISS or Cajanal.  In addition, age explains the higher risk of individuals in
the older two risk groups, i.e., 45 to 60 years and older than 60; these groups are proportionally
larger among incumbents than among new entrants.  However, incumbent’s proportion of enrolees
in the younger age groups (< 1, 1 to 4, 5 to 14) is lower than that of new entrants, but those
younger than 1 year of age show an above-average risk.
Regarding the validity of SRHS, it is obvious that this variable cannot be used as a prospec-
tive risk adjuster because of its vulnerability to gaming in an underwriting process.  However, it
is useful as an indicator of risk when individuals candidly report their health status in a general-
purpose survey where no gains are expected from giving biased answers.  Thus, measurement
bias is not considered a major issue in this case.  It has also been shown that SRHS has limited
reliability, as respondents frequently change their answer if a more detailed set of questions is
raised (Crossley and Kennedy, 2002).
Nevertheless, this variable is used here with these limitations, because of comparability
advantages: on the one hand, it was included in both 1997 and 2003 surveys with exactly the
same wording. On the other hand, both surveys have the same sample design, improving con-
fidence of inter-survey comparisons.  In addition, as said before, the lack of a more reliable
measure and the availability of SHRS, makes it a second-best alternative.
It is important to point that this study treats insurance status as the result of one single
decision at the individual level.  Most of the literature on insurance treats this status as the12 BIASED SELECTION WITHIN THE SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN COLOMBIA
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result of two decisions: the individual’s decision to apply and the insurer’s decision to accept
the applicant.  Thus, insurance status is the result of two decisions that most of the times
cannot be observed separately from survey data.  This requires a different econometric ap-
proach, like joint partial observability models (see for example, Trujillo and McCalla (2004)
and Shmueli (2001)).  However, it is clear that insurers in the Contributory Scheme in Colom-
bia are prohibited from rejecting applicants, and the effect of cream-skimming strategies is less
likely to lead to outright rejection of applicants.
Why should one be worried about biased selection in a competitive insurance market like
the Colombian Contributory Scheme? The first point of concern is that the competitive ap-
proach has been embraced as a strategy to improve overall efficiency and quality of the
health system, so if biased selection causes inefficiency and can even reduce quality (by
skimping on care for high-spenders), the market approach seems to have a limited effect.
This is even more worrisome when the market share of incumbents is large enough to cause
disbalances in public finances.  In the Colombia case, incumbents were ill-prepared for com-
petition, lacking the necessary flexibility to face the challenges of new entrants and on top of
that were hit by adverse selection.  This has led these organizations to financial difficulties
that have had to be bailed out by the central government.
Then, if new entrants enjoyed favorable selection, would it mean that the government paid
them more than the actuarially fair premiums that would correspond to the actual risk of their
enrolees (allowing them to capture rents), and in addition it had to bail out the incumbents to
compensate them for adverse selection?  It seems that the answer is not necessarily yes, be-
cause new entrants have also faced increasingly high loss ratios.  The association of private
health insurers reports that loss ratios have increased from 81% to 84% between 2000 and
2003 (Castano, 2004), so the overall balance seems to be a growth in loss ratios with a higher
growth among incumbents.  Given that the per-capita premium has not kept pace with growing
loss ratios, biased selection has caused higher losses among incumbents than capture of rents
among new entrants.
Another point that has been raised in the literature about biased selection is the phenom-
enon known as regression to the mean (RTM), by which high-spenders will eventually die or
return to low-spending patterns, whereas low-spenders will eventually become high-spenders
(Wilensky and Rositter, 1986). It could be argued that the growing loss ratios that new entrants
face during the last four years is a manifestation of such RTM.  But this argument is not enough
to expect a long-term equilibrium of risks between incumbents and new entrants: on the one
hand, incumbents also face growing loss ratios, and on the other hand, RTM would take longer
to materialize, because young-healthy individuals are less likely to become ill as compared to
elder- healthy ones.  So, it would take longer for incumbents to even out their risks with new
entrants than it takes for incumbents to fall into financial failure.
In the same lines of RTM, Mello et al (2003) argue that as new entrants’ market share
increases, the room for biased selection is reduced, because the insurer has a wider provider
network and it is more likely that the ill and the elderly find their provider and doctor in the new
entrants’ network.  The issue for the Colombia case is to what extent the trend shown betweenRAMÓN CASTAÑO Y ANDRÉS ZAMBRANO 13
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1997 and 2003 will persist and the incumbents will worsen their adverse retention problem, or
to what extent the risk-mix will even out.
In the end, the fate of incumbents in the Colombia case is to improve performance or leave
the market.  Given their severe rigidities that made organizational changes unlikely in the short
run, and their exposure to adverse selection, the question is how much political will the govern-
ment has to strengthen these organizations and turn them into capable competitors.  As of mid
2005, the government shut down Cajanal and Caprecom, and the ISS is facing severe financial
difficulties.  But their decreasing share of enrolment makes their financial woes less pressing as
compared to the early years after the reform.
But a key question is: was it an inescapable outcome of the market approach or was it avoid-
able by strengthening these organizations without necessarily giving up to their demands for bail
outs? After all, it is strategically important for the government to have a strong public player in the
field, not only to shape the market with a pro-competitive behavior instead of more regulations,
but also to keep a good bargaining position vis a vis their private counterparts.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study shows that biased selection has taken place during the first decade of health care
reform in the Contributory Scheme in Colombia.  Insurers existing prior to the reform were
affected by adverse selection, whereas new entrants enjoyed favorable selection.  This bias
widened between 1997 and 2003, with a concomitant migration of enrolees from incumbents
towards new entrants, but a disproportionate retention of high risks among incumbents.
Market approaches to social health insurance in developing countries, with large-scale pool-
ing of contributions and per-capita payments, are expected to generate incentives for efficiency
but also for biased selection.  It is recommended that governments keep this in mind, as the
disproportionate concentration of high-risks within previously existing social insurance funds
are likely to force governments to bail out them for excess losses, whereas new entrants enjoy-
ing favorable selection will be able to reap excess profits.
Correcting market failures with more regulations seems a sensible course of action. How-
ever, regulations also have limited impact due to the same market failures underlying insurance
markets. Promoting more transparent competition through a strong public player that shapes
the market and gives the government the necessary bargaining power vis a vis the new entrants,
seems a reasonable strategy.  But this requires a set of measures to avoid adverse selection, as
shown in this study.
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1997 2003 
  SRHS good  SRHS bad  SRHS good  SRHS bad 
p value 
 
 Incumbent   77.68%  22.32%  72.26%  27.74%  p <0.01 










Condition   
 Incumbent   85.97%  14.03%  77.13%  22.87%  p <0.01 
 New entrant   86.63%  13.37% 85.48%  14.52%  N.S. 
1,997 2,003 
  SRHS good  SRHS bad 
 Incumbent           0.287           0.384  
 New entrant           0.223           0.224  
  No Chronic Condition 
Chronic 
Condition 
 Incumbent           0.163           0.297  
 New entrant           0.154           0.170  
 1997  2003 
Age-gender categories  SRHSbad  SRHSgood  SRHSbad  SRHSgood 
<  1  18.01% 81.99% 14.01% 85.99% 
1 to 4  20.90%  79.10%  17.79%  82.21% 
5 to 14  20.42%  79.58%  16.98%  83.02% 
15 to 44 male  21.47%  78.53%  19.17%  80.83% 
15 to 44 female  30.01%  69.99%  26.65%  73.35% 
45 to 59  47.45%  52.55%  43.98%  56.02% 
>  60  67.50% 32.50% 66.06% 33.94% 
TABLE 1
BIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF PROPORTIONS AND COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO SURVEYS
TABLE 2
RATIO OF HIGH-RISKS TO LOW-RISKS FOR THE TWO SURVEYS
TABLE 3
PROPORTIONS OF HIGH-RISK (SRHSBAD) VS LOW-RISK ENROLEES (SRHSGOOD),
ACCORDING TO AGE-GENDER CATEGORIES OF THE RISK-ADJUSTED PER-CAPITA
PREMIUM. (PEARSON CORRELATION TESTS: 1997: 420.56, P<0.01; 2003: 691.27,
P<0.01)16 BIASED SELECTION WITHIN THE SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN COLOMBIA
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